History of Philosophy Workshop: Lydia Deni Gamboa López, "Ockham's Theory of Judgments and Complex Apprehensions"

Please join us as we continue our lunchtime history of philosophy workshops! Each meeting will consist of a presentation by a graduate student or faculty on a project that they are working on in the history of philosophy, followed by a period of comments/questions from the other participants. The workshop is designed to give grad students and faculty the opportunity to develop ideas and receive helpful feedback on projects/papers in a friendly and low stakes environment. 

This week's presenter is our visiting grant recipient Lydia Deni Gamboa López. Her talk is titled "Ockham's Theory of Judgments and Complex Apprehensions" (abstract below).

Lunch is provided with sign-up! For more information, please email Dylan MacFarlane. We hope to see you there!

Abstract: According to Susan Brower-Toland and Elizabeth Karger, Ockham claims, in his early writings, that all judgments have mental propositions as their objects. In this paper I propose a new reconstruction of Ockham’s theory of judgments and complex apprehensions. My aim is to show that for Ockham—in his early and mature writings, every act of judgment is related to a mental proposition, which means that every act of judgment has propositional content, but some judgments have singular things as their objects, while others have mental propositions as their objects,  which means that some propositions are conscious while others are not, and only conscious propositions are the objects of some acts of judgment.

Originally published at historyofphilosophy.nd.edu. Please check their event page for details, since this event section may not reflect any changes to the event.